Structured Analytic Techniques (SAT) can help analysts produce more accurate and reliable judgments and estimates

In civilian foreign affairs analysis they have proven to be as effective as in intelligence assessments.

 At their core, SATs can be viewed as an assortment of cognitive-enhancing techniques used for organizing and externalizing analytic reasoning.

“A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis”[i] identifies 12 base SATs and groups them into three categories, each defined by its chief analytic purpose: to foster diagnostic, contrarian, or imaginative reasoning.

Diagnostic techniques are primarily aimed at making analytic arguments, assumptions, or intelligence gaps more transparent.

Contrarian techniques explicitly challenge current thinking.

Imaginative thinking techniques aim at developing new insights, different perspectives and/or develop alternative outcomes.

A more extensive and detailed taxonomy was proposed by Richards J. Heuer Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson in their seminal work “Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis”[ii].

The cornerstone of this taxonomy, however, was laid some years before by Richards J. Heuer Jr.[iii] who separated SAT from three other analytic domains:

Unaided Expert Judgement

Is the traditional way for doing analysis usually based on individual effort. The reasoning remains largely in the mind of an individual analyst until it is written down in a draft report. The corresponding skill set includes evidentiary reasoning, historical method, case study method, reasoning by analogy.

Quantitative Methods using Expert-generated Data

Typically include subjective probability judgments. The corresponding skill set includes Bayesian inference, dynamic modelling, and simulation.

Quantitative Methods using Empirical Data

A common example of this method is econometric modelling.

The Structured analytic techniques thus represent a distinctly different and separate domain.

In accordance with the Heuer-Pherson taxonomy it is further broken down eight subdomains.

While our course only aims to teach SAT foundations it currently incorporates some 16 techniques from selected subdomains.

Use of SAT can aid foreign affairs analysis in dealing with two major sources of analytic error: cognitive biases and random noise.

Let’s start with the issue of information versus noise.[v]

Data is toxic to analytic judgments even in moderate quantity. It has been empirically proven that more data does not result in better estimates. It only raises analyst’s confidence in the accuracy of own conclusions. (For more details, look up Paul Slovic’s study of racetrack handicappers).

Search for more information tends to contaminate analysis with more noise. Continuous updating of hypothesis burns up a tremendous amount of time. While bringing little, if any, increase in accuracy, it seriously risks getting analytic reasoning hijacked by confirmation bias.

Most of data signals surrounding an analyst and continuously assaulting his mind is not information but precisely noise – data that is random, untrue, faked, irrelevant, incomplete and meaningless.

Since we consider own judgments prized possessions, these turn sticky. More random noise will only make one more confident in one’s initial hypothesis formed on the basis of vague and incomplete information.

A typical error of collection is aiming to continuously monitor data sources. The more frequently one looks at data, the lower the ratio of signal to noise tends to become. With time, noise prevails over evidence and skews analytic reasoning. Foreign affairs analysis degenerates into fantasy.

It turns out that standard collection practices can encourage and even REQUIRE analysts to AIM AT CAPTURING NOISE. The result is predictable: junk in – junk out.

In order to arrive at a particular judgment analysts do not need more data. What they need, is to focus and filter out the noise that is hijacking their reasoning.

Humans as a species tend to be demonstrably arrogant about what they think they know. They have a tendency to think that they know a bit more than they actually do. The field of foreign affairs analysis is but one example. While overestimating what they know, people at the same time underestimate uncertainty. Overconfidence can have a toxic effect on analysts. It motivates them to adopt vastly more risky positions than warranted by available information. Analyst overconfidence results in blindness to errors and is a primary reason for the most epic intelligence failures.

Overconfidence is often borne out of disregard for the uncertainty inherent in most analytic problems. Probability is a non-intuitive concept – it cannot be easily derived from everyday experience. We study it in certain depth, but here is a quick primer on the subject.

These and other concepts linked to the field of knowledge dealing with STRUCTURED ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES are discussed at some greater length in our course. Besides, its core added value lies in several practical case studies that provide participants with templates for essential SAT and experience in their use.

[i] US Government, March 2009

[ii] CQ Press, 2nd edition 2015

[iii] “Taxonomy of Structured Analytic Techniques” (paper prepared for the International Studies Association 2008 Annual Convention)

[iv] For example, “Sleipnir: The Long Matrix for Organised Crime, an analytical technique for determining relative levels of threat posed by organised crime groups”, Royal Canadian Mounted Police Criminal Analysis Branch, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, 2000.

[v] In the next paragraphs we discuss and offer own illustrations of the ideas expressed by Nassim Taleb in “The Black Swan” and “Antifragility”.

Our instructor’s CV is available on request


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